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reasonableness.4 9 Louisiana is therefore left with an alimony scheme
which allows the wife or ex-wife to place the burden of support on her
husband by her refusal to work, without any justification for such a
system. Now that Louisiana's alimony scheme has escaped constitutional
"scrutiny," the only change from the prior jurisprudence may be a
lessening of the husband's duty to support his children and perhaps the
husband may receive alimony after divorce if subsequent decisions follow
the dicta in Whitt v. Vauthier. In its refusal to face the problem of sex
discrimination in Ward and Favrot the court missed an opportunity to
revise its interpretation of the alimony articles to make the burden on the
husband more reasonable. However, due to the holdings of the supreme
court, an ex-wife may refuse to supply her own needs for reasons of
"indolence, spite or revenge" '50 and force her ex-husband to support her.
Douglas C. Longman, Jr.
THE NATURE OF ALIMONY-SEPARATE OR COMMUNITY OBLIGATION?
Following a judgment of separation from his second wife, a husband
sued for partition of the community property. The wife sought reimburse-
ment for one half of the alimony and child support payments made by her
husband to his first wife using funds of the second community. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the wife was not entitled to reimburse-
ment.' The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the appellate court ruling
with regard to the alimony and child support payments2 and held that
because the obligations to pay alimony and child support are imposed by
49. The United States Supreme Court upheld classifications which discrimi-
nated against men in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), as more stringent promotion requirements for male
officers and a state taxation plan granting property tax deduction to widows but not
to widowers were approved. Both classifications were concerned with a female
receiving benefits from the state or governmental operation and not a classification
that levied a duty on the male to provide a female with a portion of his economic
resources. But see Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E. 2d 458 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
50. 339 So. 2d at 843.
I. Connell v. Connell, 316 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
2. The judgment was amended on other grounds, however.
1977] NOTES
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
law, arise monthly during the marriage, and are not antenuptial debts
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2403, 3 the wife is due no accounting
for the community funds expended. Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4 (La.
1976).
The Civil Code does not specifically state whether alimentary obliga-
tions are separate or community. Article 2403 provides that debts incurred
prior to marriage are to be paid with separate funds, 4 while debts incurred
during marriage are to be paid with community funds. The jurisprudence
has consistently held that a judgment of alimony is neither an ordinary debt
nor an antenuptial debt, but rather an obligation imposed by law5 which is
uncertain as to amount and maturity.6 Thus article 2403 does not explicitly
categorize alimentary obligations.
Under Spanish law, recognized by Louisiana jurisprudence as the
source of article 2403,7 if a spouse was burdened by an obligation imposed
by law, such as a penal' or delictual obligation, 9 his share of the communi-
ty could be reached to satisfy the obligation provided his separate assets
3. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2403: "In the same manner, the debts contracted during
the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains, and must be ac-
quitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband and wife, anterior
to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their own personal and individual ef-
fects."
4. E.g., Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973) (notes issued
in settlement of a former community); Markham v. Allen, 22 La. Ann. 513 (1870)
(debt contracted by husband before marriage); Bank of Louisiana v. Wilcox, 2 La.
Ann. 344 (1847) (antenuptial note made by wife).
5. E.g., Arabie v. Arabie, 230 La. 1036, 89 So. 2d 890 (1956) (ten-year
prescription of Louisiana Civil Code article 3547 does not apply to a judgment of
alimony because it is not a money judgment founded on a debt, but rather is a
continuing legal obligation); Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954)
(judgment of child support is not an antenuptial debt, but an obligation imposed by
law); State exrel. Huber v. King, 49 La. Ann. 1503, 22 So. 887 (1897) (imprisonment
for failure to pay alimony is not imprisonment for failure to pay debt). The United
States Supreme Court has also held that alimony is not a debt. Wetmore v. Markoe,
196 U.S. 68 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903); Audubon v. Shufeldt,
181 U.S. 575 (1901).
6. Festervand v. Laster, 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634 (2d Cir. 1930).
7. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. 1973); Fazzio v.
Krieger, 226 La. 511, 518, 76 So. 2d 713,715 (1954); Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann.
226, 228 (1847). For a discussion of the Spanish community of gains, see Pugh, The
Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad De Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. I
(1969).
8. Pugh, supra note 7, at 22.
9. See L. ROBBINS, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS WITH TRANSLATIONS OF THE
COMMENTARIES THEREON OF MATIENZO, AZEVEDO AND GUTTIERREZ 86 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as ROBBINS].
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were insufficient. Alimentary obligations, also imposed by law, were
dealt with similarly.10 Spanish law also characterized as separate those
debts incurred during marriage for the benefit of one spouse only, such as
debts resulting from that spouse's suretyship." It seems clear from the
examples given that any obligation, whether a contractual debt or one
imposed by law, not ultimately benefiting the marriage but concerning the
affairs of only one spouse, was regarded as a separate obligation of that
spouse.1
2
Prior to the instant case the jurisprudence had not dealt squarely with
the issue of whether an alimony judgment is a community or separate
obligation.13 The courts had, however, dealt with the nature of voluntary
support payments. In Succession of Boyer"a the wife was not allowed to
claim recompense from her husband's heirs for expenditures of common
- funds by the husband for the support of his child of a former marriage in
the absence of evidence that he intended such expenditures to be separate
expenses. Subsequent cases15 also treated voluntary satisfaction of the
husband's alimentary obligation with community funds as non-reim-
bursable to the wife. This treatment was not consistent with the Spanish
view that alimentary obligations are separate with reimbursement due for
community funds expended to satisfy the obligation.' 6
Unlike the clear holding in Boyer regarding voluntary payments,
there had been no determination of the nature of alimony judgments.
However, there were cases which, while dealing with other issues, may
aid in understanding the issue before the court in the instant case. The
supreme court in Fazzio v. Krieger 7 held that one-half of the income of
the second community could be considered in determining the amount to
be awarded for the support of the children of a prior marriage. The
language of the decision indicates the court may have considered the
obligation the husband's alone because the court spoke of considering his
10. See id. at 86, 262-63; W. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 165 at 393 (2d. ed. 1971); Pugh, supra note 7, at 21.
11. Pugh, supra note 7, at 22.
12. Id. at 21-25.
13. But there had been a federal case in which alimony was held to be a
community obligation. Godchaux v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. La.
1952), discussed in the text at note 40, infra.
14. 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884).
15. E.g., Succession of Ratcliff, 209 La. 224, 24 So. 2d 456 (1945); Succession
of Applegate, 39 La. Ann. 400, 2 So. 42 (1887).
16. ROBBINS, supra note 9, at 263.
17. 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
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share of the community income. I8 Several appellate cases followed Fazzio
in determining the husband's ability to pay alimony by considering the
husband's half of the second wife's income. 9 One of these, White v.
Klein,20 discussed garnishing the husband's half of the second communi-
ty. Such language indicates that the courts considered the obligation as
owed by the husband alone because they spoke of considering or garnish-
ing only the husband's half of the community income rather than the
whole. However, the appellate court in the instant case 21 interpreted the
Fazzio court's inclusion of the husband's share of the second wife's
income to mean that "the obligation of the husband to make current
payments of alimony and child support to his first wife are debts of the
second community, and that they are not separate debts of the husband.' '22
This interpretation is based upon the conclusion in Fazzio that the obliga-
tion is "clearly a valid liability of the second community." 23 However,
when considered in the context of the opinion, which relied heavily upon
Spanish sources, 4 the statement should be interpreted to mean that the
obligation, while initially enforceable out of the community, is ultimately
enforced out of the husband's half of the community.25
In 1973 Fazzio and White were overruled by the landmark case of
Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc. 26 insofar as they permitted the husband's
separate creditors to seize only his half of the community to satisfy his
separate obligations. Creech held that the husband's separate creditors
could seize the entire community in satisfaction of his separate debts
because, as between the husband and third parties, the husband's pat-
rimony includes the entire community. The wife, however, is entitled to
18. "[T]he trial judge was correct in considering the husband's half of the
income of the second community in fixing the amount awarded for the maintenance
and support of his children by a former marriage." Id. at 522, 76 So. 2d at 716.
19. Lopez v. Lopez, 264 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); White v. Klein,
263 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 262 La. 1097, 266 So. 2d 223 (1972);
Morace v. Morace, 220 So. 2d 775 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1969); Lytell v. Lytell, 144 So.
2d 925 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
20. 263 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 262 La. 1097, 266 So. 2d 223
(1972).
21. Connell v. Connell, 316 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
22. Id. at 426.
23. 226 La. 511,518, 76 So. 2d 713, 715 (1954).
24. Id.
25. See the text at notes 7-12, supra.
26. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973). Creech, however, may be overruled by Louisi-
ana Civil Code article 2398 as reenacted by the legislature in the 1976 Regular
Session. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-
Matrimonial Regimes, 37 LA. L. REV. 123, 125-29 (1976).
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reimbursement for her half of the community assets seized to satisfy those
debts because, as between husband and wife, the debts are separate and
must be acquitted from separate assets. Subsequent to Creech, cases
involving the fixing of alimony merely state that the second wife's income
must be considered in fixing the amount to be awarded without specifical-
ly referring to the husband's half of her income.27 This may be construed
as simply meaning that alimony is enforceable out of the entire community
as part of the husband's patrimony leaving unresolved the question of
reimbursement to the wife on dissolution. However, not all of the cases,
even before Creech, specifically spoke of considering only the husband's
share of the second wife's income.28
In another post-Creech case, Finley v. Finley,2 9 the First Circuit
Court of Appeal held that it is proper to consider the second wife's
income, even though she is separate in property, in fixing the amount to be
awarded to the husband's children of a former marriage since the second
wife must contribute to the expenses of the marriage. In denying a
rehearing, the court stated that the obligation of the second wife to
contribute enhanced the ability of the husband to support his children.
30
The ambiguous language of the court could be interpreted to mean that the
alimony payments were expenses of the marriage. A better interpretation
is that the court was simply stating that because the wife must contribute to
the expenses of the marriage, the husband has more resources to commit to
obligations not involving the marriage. This construction seems proper
because alimony payments have little in common with expenses tradition-
ally regarded as expenses of the marriage such as family supplies, hous-
ing, education of the children of the marriage, 3 taxes on community
property and taxes on separate property producing community income 32-
27. Swider v. Swider, 314 So. 2d 372 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So.
2d 551 (La. 1975); Phillips v. Phillips, 319 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
28. Marcus v. Burnett, 282 So. 2d 122 (La. 1973).
29. 305 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
30. The court stated, "[W]e find that the obligation of the present Mrs. Finley
to contribute to the marriage expenses enhances the ability of Mr. Finley to provide
for the support of his children." Id. at 658.
31. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2345, 2389, 2395; First Natchez Bank v. Moss, 52
La. Ann. 1524, 28 So. 133 (1900); McElvin v. Taylor, 30 La. Ann. 552 (1878); Hardin
v. Wolf & Cerf., 29 La. Ann. 333 (1877); Hill v. Tippet, 10 La. Ann. 554 (1855);
Fenn v. Holmes, 6 La.Ann. 199 (1851); Madison v. Jackson, 14 La. App. 279, 131
So. 736 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
32. R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 78 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as PASCAL]. Wives who are separate in property or administer their parapher-
nal property must contribute to the expenses of the marriage. Wives under a
community regime are not required to contribute if the husband has administration
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all of which involve the common life of the spouses. Applying the Spanish
criterion of benefit to the marriage, these traditional marital expenses
would be community obligations but alimony would not. If, as seems
unlikely, Finley stands for the proposition that alimony payments are
expenses of the marriage, the case would of course mean that alimony
payments are community obligations.
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the obliga-
tion to support arises monthly during the existence of the second marriage
and is therefore dischargeable from community funds. The court relied on
the holding in Fazzio that the husband's obligation to support his first
family is not an antenuptial debt, but one imposed by law and arising
during the second marriage. The court further stated that the wife was due
no accounting for funds used to satisfy the obligation.33 Creech was
distinguished because it dealt with debts arising before marriage so that the
wife was entitled to reimbursement on dissolution. The opinion further
denied recovery by the wife on the ground that she failed to show that the
husband's support payments enhanced his separate property as required by
Louisiana Civil Code article 2408. 34
The decision in the instant case supports the view that any debt or
obligation of the husband arising during the existence of the community is
a community obligation unless there is a showing that his separate property
of the paraphernal property because the revenues produced by her property are
community. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2385, 2386. Any obligation incurred by the hus-
band, or wife with his authorization, which is an expense of the marriage-a matter
of common concern-is certainly a community obligation.
33. Justice Summers concurred in the result but was of the opinion that the
obligation to support was antenuptial and followed the spouse into the second
marriage as a community obligation because of the special status of obligations
imposed by the state as opposed to obligations owed to other creditors. He argued
that ordinary creditors, unlike the state, should not be able to compel use of
community assets to satisfy separate debts. 331 So. 2d at 8-9. Justice Tate also
concurred, being-of the opinion that the obligation was not antenuptial but a
continuing obligation arising periodically during the second marriage; thus no ac-
counting was due the second wife on dissolution. Id. at 9, 11. In a footnote to his
opinion, Justice Tate pointed out that the decision does not address the issue of the
husband's accountability if the support payments exceeded the second wife's share
of.the earnings. Id. at 10 n.2.
34. This part of the opinion seems unnecessary since the court had already
concluded that the obligations were community obligations. To apply article 2408, it
would have to be shown that the debt was of a separate nature, which the court
denied in its interpretation of article 2403. It does seem that if the obligation were
declared separate the wife could support her claim by arguing that the use of
community funds enhanced the husband's separate estate by reducing debt claims
against it. No cases were found in which such an argument was made.
has been enhanced by the use of community funds.35 Construed against
their Spanish background, 36 however, articles 2403 and 2408 do not
support the supreme court's reasoning. An obligation is not a community
obligation simply because it arises during the existence of the community.
For example, a wife who commits a tort while not on a community
mission may not bind the community assets for the liability37 imposed by
article 231538 because the wife may bind the community only with the
husband's consent. That the wife's delictual obligation is her separate
obligation is certainly consistent with the Spanish view, though the rule is
based on her lack of authority to bind the community without the hus-
band's consent. Applying Spanish principles, obligations which are of
common concern would be community and those which are not, regardless
of when they arise, would be separate. Those obligations which would be
of common concern would logically seem to be those which benefit the
common life of the husband and wife and the children of their marriage
such as the traditional expenses of the marriage discussed earlier. 39 It is
difficult to see how alimony payments benefit the common life of the
husband and wife and the children of the marriage.
Apart from the theoretical aspects of the case, a policy consideration
not discussed but possibly pertinent to the court's reasoning is the income
tax liability of the second wife. In Godchaux v. United States' the
government, arguing that alimony is a separate debt, sought to bar the
second wife from taking a deduction for one-half of the husband's alimony
35. This view has support in prior jurisprudence: Godchaux v. United States,
102 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. La. 1952) (alimony payments are community obligations);
Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954) (interpreted by the appellate
court in the instant case as meaning the obligation to pay alimony is community);
Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884) (second wife could not recover for
voluntary support payments by her husband to his child.of a prior marriage).
36. See PASCAL, supra note 32, at 78.
37. E.g., Walker v. Fontenot, 329 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
332 So. 2d 217 (La. 1976); Kipp v. Hurdle, 307 So. 2d 125 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 So. 2d 643 (La. 1975). It would be consistent also if the husband's
delicts committed while engaged in activity not benefiting the community were also
to be considered separate, with reimbursement to the wife upon dissolution should
community assets be used to satisfy the obligation. No cases have been found on
this point but Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950), suggests the
obligation would be community were such an issue to be raised.
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 provides in part: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
39. See the text at notes 31 and 32, supra, with regard to traditional expenses
of the marriage which are, of course, common concerns.
40, 102 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. La. 1952).
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payments made to his former wife. While the court held that the obligation
was community and the wife was thus entitled to the deduction, the
implication is clear that should the obligation be considered separate by the
courts, the second wife would not be entitled to any deduction and the
husband would be allowed to deduct the entire amount. Considering the
obligation as separate would therefore increase the wife's tax liability, a
result the court in the instant case may have wished to avoid.4
Although it has been suggested that alimentary obligations of both
spouses should be community, 42 as the codal scheme now exists, properly
interpreted in light of its historical foundation, obligations of one spouse
only should ultimately be paid out of that spouse's separate property.
Relying on the Spanish sources, Professor Pascal states that under the
principles evident in Louisiana Civil Code articles 2403 and 2408, "[o]bli-
gations incurred by the spouses in matters pertaining to common concerns
should be paid out of the common funds. On the other hand obligations
incurred by either spouse in relation to his separate affairs should be paid
out of his separate funds." 43 He further states that "[i]f community funds
are used to pay separate obligations . . . , then there must be an account-
ing at the dissolution of the community of gains." 44 Professor Pascal
regards alimentary obligations as the separate responsibility of the obli-
gated spouse under the codal scheme as they concern only that spouse. 4 5
It is hoped that the supreme court will reconsider the instant case in
light of the principles and background of Louisiana's community property
laws and decide in accordance with those principles. Regardless of
whether the court takes such action, the legislature should amend article
2403 to insure the consistent treatment of both spouses' alimentary obliga-
tions. If alimentary obligations are to be community, certainly the wife's
obligation to support her ascendants and descendants,4 6 if not former
spouses as well,47 should be treated just as the husband's obligation of
41. Godchaux involved separate returns filed by husband and wife. Apparently
the deduction problem would not arise if a joint return is filed.
42. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Matrimonial Regimes, 37 LA. L. REV. 358, 359-60 (1977).
43. PASCAL, supra note 32, at 78.
44. Id. at 220-21.
45. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-
Persons, 16 LA. L. REV. 218, 220-22 (1956). This view is reiterated in Professor
Pascal's comment on the instant case in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 37 LA. L. REV. 358, 359-60
(1977).
46. LA. CIv. CODE art. 229.
47. Whitt v. Vauthier, 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So.
2d 558 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976). This case has been heavily
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support. Practicality may demand that one spouse be the manager of
community assets, but fairness demands the manager not be given unfair
advantages at the expense of the other spouse. Alternatively, the legisla-
ture should clarify the article to reflect its Spanish heritage by specifically
making alimentary obligations separate. The primary purposes of com-
munity property are to provide for the expenses of the common life and to
provide that the spouses share equally in the growth and acquisition of
assets produced by their common labor and industry. Without the consent
of the other spouse, neither spouse should be able to jeopardize the assets
properly belonging to the other in pursuance of his own affairs. By treating
alimentary obligations as separate such jeopardy would be avoided con-
sistently with the purposes of community property. Fairness and clarity
demand one alternative or the other, but as few persons would like the idea
of supporting a spouse's former spouse, in addition to the other reasons set
forth, the proposal that the obligations be made separate is more plausible.
Phillip L. McIntosh
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND TITLE VII-
MORE DEFERENCE TO THE REASONABLE PRACTICES OF
LAWMAKERS AND EMPLOYERS
Alleging racial discrimination in effect, though not in purpose, claim-
ants asserted that a personnel test given by the District of Columbia police,
resulting in the rejection of their job applications, was unrelated to job
performance and thus violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment as well as certain federal statutes.' Following a district court dismiss-
al,' the court of appeals3 found a constitutional violation, based upon the
criticized. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976
Term-Persons, 37 LA. L. REV. 305, 310-11 (1977).
I. Claimants, intervenors in a class action challenging D.C. police force
recruiting policies, asserted violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and D.C. Code §
1-320 (1973 & Supp. 1975) requiring that police force appointments be made in
conformity with federal Civil Service provisions. The instant case dealt only with a
motion for summary judgment regarding the validity of a written Civil Service
personnel exam.
2. 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.C. 1972) (granting federal parties' motion for summary
judgment based on constitutional and statutory grounds and denying claimants'
motion based solely on the Constitution).
3. 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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